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This paper reviews the unconventional U.S. monetary policy responses to the financial and real crises
of 2007-09, divided into three groups: interest rate policy, quantitative policy, and credit policy. To
interpret interest rate policy, it compares the Federal Reserve’s actions with the literature on optimal
policy in a liquidity trap. The theory suggests that, to minimize the length and severity of the recession,
would require a stronger commitment to low interest rates for an extended period of time. To interpret
quantitative policy, the paper reviews the determination of inflation under different policy regimes. The
main danger for inflation from current actions is that the Federal Reserve may lose its policy independence;
a beneficial side effect of the crisis is that the Friedman rule can be implemented by paying interest
on reserves. To interpret credit policy, the paper presents a new model of capital market imperfections with
different financial institutions and a role for securitization, leveraging, and mark-to-market accounting.
The model suggests that providing credit to traders in securities markets can restore liquidity with
fewer government funds than extending credit to the originators of loans.
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The last two years have been an exciting time to be a student of monetary policy and 
central banking. Variability in the data is what allows us to learn about the world, and 
variability has not been in short supply in the United States, with wide swings in asset prices, 
threats to financial stability, concerns about regulation, sharply rising unemployment, and a 
global recession. But these have been difficult times to be a central banker. The limited tools 
at the disposal of the Federal Reserve have been far from sufficient to put out so many fires, 
and many of the challenges have caught central bankers unprepared for what not so long ago 
seemed highly improbable.  
This paper reviews the Federal Reserve’s actions in 2007-09 and interprets them in 
the light of economic theory. “Interpret” is the operative word here, since any attempt to 
describe and evaluate all that has happened would be doomed to fail. On the one hand, so 
much has already happened that it would take a book, or perhaps many books, to describe and 
account for it all. On the other hand, the crisis and its reprecussions are far from over, so that 
any assessment runs the risk of quickly becoming obsolete. I will therefore avoid, as far as I 
can, making pronouncements on what policies seem right or wrong, even with the benefit of 
hindsight, and I will not give a comprehensive account of all the events and policies. My 
more modest ambition is to provide an early summary of monetary policy’s reaction to the 
crisis thus far, to interpret this reaction using economic theory, and to identify some of the 
questions that it raises.  
I start in section I with brief accounts of the crisis and of the Federal Reserve’s 
responses. These fall into three categories. The first is interest rate policy and concerns the 
targets that the Federal Reserve sets for the interest rates that it controls. Figure 1 illustrates 
the recent changes by plotting two key interest rates targeted by the Federal Reserve over the 
last 20 years. These rates are as low today as they have been in this entire period, and the 
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Figure 2 illustrates the second set of policies, which I label quantitative policy. These 
involve changes in the size of the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve and in the composition 
of its liabilities. The figure plots an adjusted measure of reserves held by banks in the Federal 
Reserve system and the monetary base (currency plus reserves), both as ratios to GDP, since 
1929. In September 2009 adjusted reserves were equal to 6.8 percent of GDP, a value 3 
exceeded in the history of the Federal Reserve System only once, between June and 
December 1940. The monetary base is as large relative to GDP as it has ever been in the last 
50 years.  
 
[figure 2 about here] 
 
The third set of policies, which I label credit policy, consists of managing the asset 
side of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. To gauge the radical change in the composition 
of these assets since the crisis began, figure 3 plots the ratios of U.S. Treasury bills and of all 
Treasury securities held by the Federal Reserve to its total assets.
2 From a status quo where 
the Federal Reserve held almost exclusively Treasury securities, in the last two years it has 
switched toward holding many other types of assets and, more recently, toward securities 
with longer maturity.  
 
[figure 3 about here] 
 
I start my assessment in section II with this last group of policies, because they are the 
least understood in theory. Using a new model of capital markets, I investigate the effects of 
the Federal Reserve’s different investments on the availability of credit.
3 In the model, four 
groups of actors—entrepreneurs, lenders, traders, and investors—all have funds that must be 
reallocated through the financial system toward investment and production, but frictions 
among these groups may lead to credit shortages at different points in the system. Different 
credit programs implemented by the central bank will have different effects depending on 
whether they tighten or loosen these credit constraints, and depending on the equilibrium 
interactions between different markets. Drawing on the model, section III goes on to suggest 
that whereas the Federal Reserve’s credit policies to date have been directed at a wide range 
of markets and institutions, focusing the central bank’s efforts on senior secured loans to 
traders in securities markets would be the most effective way to fight the crisis.  
Next, in section IV, I move to quantitative policy and ask the following question: do 
the recent increases in reserves and in the central bank’s balance sheet undermine the ability 
of the current policy regime to control inflation? I show that according to a standard model of 
price-level determination, the regime is threatened only if the Federal Reserve becomes 
excessively concerned with the state of its balance sheet, or if it gives in to pressure from the 
fiscal authorities, effectively surrendering its independence.  4 
Finally, in section V, I turn to interest rate policy. I briefly survey the literature on 
optimal monetary policy in a liquidity trap, which recommends committing to higher than 
normal inflation in the future and keeping the policy interest rate at zero even after the 
negative real shocks have passed. Although the Federal Reserve’s actions fit these 
prescriptions qualitatively, the theoretical model developed below suggests that a stronger 
commitment to low interest rates for a prolonged period of time would have a strong 
stimulative effect. Section VI concludes.  
 
I. What Has the Federal Reserve Been up to? 
 
There are already some thorough descriptions of the events of the U.S. financial crisis 
of 2007-09.
4 After a brief and selective summary, this section catalogs the policies followed 
by the Federal Reserve in response to these events.  
 
I.A. The Financial Crisis and the Real Crisis 
In August 2007 an increase in delinquencies in subprime mortgages led to a sharp fall in the 
price of triple-A-rated mortgage-backed securities and raised suspicions about the value of 
the underlying assets. Because many banks held these securities, either directly or through 
special investment vehicles, doubts were cast over the state of banks’ balance sheets 
generally. Through 2007 the fear became widespread that many banks might fail, and 
interbank lending rates spiked to levels well above those in the federal funds market. This 
increase in risk spreads diffused over many markets, and in a few, notably the markets for 
commercial paper, private asset-backed securities, and collateralized debt obligations, the 
decline in trading volume was extreme, apparently due to lack of demand.  
In the real economy, the U.S. business cycle peaked in December 2007, according to 
the National Bureau of Economic Research. Unemployment began rising steadily from 4.9 
percent in December of 2007 to just over 10 percent in October 2009, and output decelerated 
sharply in 2008Q1. Net acquisition of financial assets by households fell from $1.023 trillion 
in 2007 to $562 billion in 2008 and to just $281 billion and $19 billion in the first two 
quarters of 2009, respectively. As of the start of 2008, however, there was still no sharp fall 5 
in total bank lending. 
In March 2008 the investment bank Bear Stearns found itself on the verge of 
bankruptcy, unable to roll over its short-term financing. The government, in a joint effort by 
the Federal Reserve and the Treasury, stepped in and arranged for the sale of Bear Stearns to 
JP Morgan Chase, providing government guarantees on some of Bear Stearns’ assets. Risk 
spreads remained high, and the asset-backed securities market was effectively closed for the 
rest of the year, but some calm was returning to markets until the dark week of September 15 
to 21 arrived.  
The extent of the crash during these seven days probably finds its rival only in the 
stock market crash of October 1929. It was marked by three distinct events. The first, on 
September 15, was the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the largest company ever to fail in 
U.S. history. This investment bank was a counterparty in many financial transactions across 
several markets, and its failure triggered defaults on contracts all over the world. The second 
event was the bailout of American International Group (AIG), one of the largest insurance 
companies in the world, on the evening of September 16. The bailout not only signaled that 
financial losses went well beyond investment banks, but also increased the uncertainty about 
how the government would respond to subsequent large bankruptcies. The third event, on 
September 20, was the announcement of the first version of the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program, or TARP (also known as the “Paulson plan” after Treasury Secretary Henry 
Paulson), which, although potentially far-reaching, was both short on detail and vague in its 
provisions.  
In the six months that followed, the stock market plunged: the S&P 500 index fell 
more than 56 percent from its peak in October 2007 to its trough in March 2009. Most 
measures of volatility, risk, and liquidity spreads increased to unprecedented levels, and 
measures of real activity around the world declined. Which of the three events was the main 
culprit for the financial crisis that followed is a question that will surely motivate much 
discussion and research in the years to come.
5  
Through all these events, the Treasury cooperated with the Federal Reserve while also 
pursuing its own policies in response to the crisis. Today, these include a plan to invest up to 
$250 billion in banks to shore up their capital, assistance to homeowners unable to pay their 
mortgages, and up to $100 billion of TARP money in public-private investments to buy 
under-performing securities from financial institutions. Since March 2009 some stability has 
returned to financial markets, with risk spreads shrinking and the stock market partly 
recovering. Forecasts of unemployment and output, however, have yet to show clear signs of 6 
improvement.  
Finally, inflation as measured using the year-on-year change in the consumer price 
index has fallen from 4.1 percent in December 2007 to -1.3 percent in September 2009. 
Inflation forecasts for the coming year, as indicated by the median answer in the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters, have fallen from 3.6 percent in the last quarter of 2007 to 0.7 
percent in the third quarter of 2009, and the forecast for average inflation over the next 10 
years has risen slightly, from 2.4 percent to 2.5 percent.  
 
I.B. The Federal Reserve’s Actions during the Crisis 
The Federal Reserve typically chooses from a very narrow set of actions in its conduct 
of monetary policy. It intervenes in the federal funds market, where many banks make 
overnight loans, by engaging in open-market operations with a handful of banks that are 
primary dealers. These operations involve collateralized purchases and sales of Treasury 
securities, crediting or debiting the banks’ holdings of reserves at the central bank. The 
Federal Reserve announces a desired target for the equilibrium interest rate in the federal 
funds market and ensures that the market clears close to this rate every day.  
Over the course of the last two years, however, the Federal Reserve’s activities have 
expanded dramatically. Table 1 provides snapshots of these recent actions at three points in 
time: in January 2007, before the start of the crisis (and representative of the decade before); 
at the end of December 2008, in the midst of the crisis; and in August 2009. The Federal 
Reserve’s policies fit into three broad categories.
6  
The first is interest rate policy. Starting from a target for the federal funds rate of 5.25 
percent for the first half of 2007, the Federal Reserve gradually reduced that target to 
effectively zero by December 2008.
7 In its policy announcements, the Federal Reserve has 
made clear that it expects to keep this rate at zero for an extended period.
8 Starting in October 
2008, the Federal Reserve has also been paying interest on both required and excess reserves 
held by commercial banks; since December 2008 the interest rate on these reserves (shown in 
figure 1) has been the same as the federal funds rate target. This implies that banks no longer 
pay an effective tax on reserves held at the central bank beyond the legal requirements. It also 
means that the Federal Reserve in the future has at its disposal a new policy instrument, the 
spread between the federal funds rate and the rate on reserves.
9 Finally, the Federal Reserve 
has purchased other securities with the stated intent of affecting their prices and yields, but 7 
there is little evidence of success.
10  
The second category, which I label quantitative policy, concerns the size of the 
Federal Reserve’s balance sheet and the composition of its liabilities. Historically, the bulk of 
these liabilities has consisted of currency in circulation plus bank reserves (most of which the 
banks are required by law to hold at the level mandated by the Federal Reserve) and deposits 
of the Treasury and foreign central banks. With the onset of the crisis, the first change in 
quantitative policy was that the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet more than doubled. Reserves 
accounted for much this increase and are now mostly voluntary, since the penalty for holding 
reserves instead of lending in the federal funds market effectively disappeared once the 
interest rates on both became the same. The other significant change was that the U.S. 
Treasury became the single largest creditor of the Federal Reserve. As a means of providing 
the Federal Reserve with Treasury securities to finance its lending programs, the Treasury has 
greatly expanded its account, and in August 2009 it held more than one-tenth of the Federal 
Reserve’s total liabilities.  
The third category is credit policy. This consists of managing the composition of the 
asset side of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. At the start of the crisis, the central bank’s 
assets were similar in composition to what they had been since its founding: mostly U.S. 
Treasury securities, with over one-third in Treasury bills and the remainder made up of 
Treasury bonds and notes together with modest amounts of foreign reserves. Rounding out 
the balance sheet were modest amounts of foreign reserves and other assets (such as gold), 
but almost no direct loans. By the height of the crisis in December 2008, however, this 
picture had changed dramatically, following the announcement of several new asset purchase 
programs
11  
The Federal Reserve’s December 31, 2008, balance sheet reveals several important 
changes in its assets from two years earlier. Starting from the top of the assets column, the 
first is a significant shift in the average maturity of Treasury securities held from short to 
long. The second is a dramatic increase in direct loans, with the Federal Reserve for the first 
time lending directly to entities other than banks. These included loans to primary dealers 
through the 28-day TSLF and the overnight PDCF and, through the TALF, to investors 
posting as collateral triple-A-rated asset-backed securities on student loans, auto loans, credit 
card loans, and Small Business Administration loans.
12 The third is an almost 30-fold 
increase in foreign reserves, reflecting a swap agreement with foreign central banks to 
temporarily provide them with dollars against foreign currency. The next three changes take 
the form of entirely new asset categories. First, through the TAF, the Federal Reserve started 8 
lending to banks for terms of 28 and 84 days against collateral at terms determined at auction. 
These auctions provide a means to lend to banks that preserves the recipients’ anonymity, to 
prevent these loans from being seen by the market as a signal of trouble at the debtor bank. In 
December 2008 these credits to banks accounted for almost one quarter of the Federal 
Reserve’s assets. Second, through the CPFF, the Federal Reserve bought 90-day commercial 
paper, thereby financing many companies directly without going through the banks. Finally, 
the Federal Reserve created three limited-liability companies, Maiden Lane LLC and Maiden 
Lane LLC II and III, to acquire and manage the assets associated with the bailouts of AIG 
and Bear Stearns.  
By August 2009 some of these programs had been reduced significantly in scope, in 
particular the holdings of commercial paper and foreign reserves. Others, however, continue 
to grow. In particular, in March 2009 the Federal Reserve announced it would purchase up to 
$300 billion in long-term Treasury bonds and $1.45 trillion in agency debt and mortgage-
backed securities; it expects to reach these goals by the end of the first quarter of 2010. These 
changes were announced at the FOMC meeting of March 2009 but had been under discussion 
for a few months before that. A large share of these purchases is already reflected in the 
August balance sheet.   
 
II. A Credit Frictions Model of Capital Markets 
 
The crisis of 2007-09 has witnessed credit disruptions involving multiple agents in 
many markets, it has seen large swings in asset-backed securities, and it has propagated from 
financial markets to the real economy. Unfortunately, no off-the-shelf economic model 
contains all of these ingredients. Before I can interpret the Federal Reserve’s policies, I must 
therefore take a detour to introduce a new model that captures them.  
Financial markets perform many roles, including the management of risk and the 
transformation of maturities. In the model I abstract from these better-understood roles to 
focus on another role of financial markets: the reallocation of funds toward productive uses. I 
take as given a starting distribution of funds across agents, and I study how trade in financial 
markets shifts these funds to where they are needed, subject to limits due to asymmetries of 
information. The model merges insights from the theory of bank contracts based on limited 
pledgeability (Holmstrom and Tirole 2009) with the theory of leverage based on collateral 9 
constraints (Kiyotaki and Moore 1997; Matsuyama 2007). It is a simpler version of a model 
fully developed in Reis (2009). The appendix lays out the model in more detail.  
 
II.A. Setting up the Model: Agents 
The model has three periods, no aggregate uncertainty, and a representative 
consumer-worker. She supplies labor L in all three periods, earning a wage W in each period, 
and consumes a final good C
″ in the last period, which is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of a 
continuum of varieties. The economy has only one storable asset, in amount H, which I will 
refer to as capital. It consists of claims issued by the government, which can be redeemed for 
the consumption good in the final period. The government levies a lump-sum tax on the 
representative household in the last period to honor these claims.
13  
The representative household has four different types of financial agents, each 
endowed with an initial allocation of capital. First, there are many investors behaving 
competitively, who hold capital M.  
Agents of the second type are entrepreneurs. There is a continuum of them in the unit 
interval associated with each variety of the consumption good. In the first period they must 
hire F units of labor to set up operations. Further labor is then hired in the second and third 
periods, to produce monopolistically in the last period a variety of consumption goods in 
amount Yi
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At the optimal choice of labor in the second and third periods, v will be the fraction of labor 
employed in the second period. Exogenous productivity, Ai
′, is independently and identically 
distributed across the continuum of firms and is revealed in the second period, before the 
labor decision is made for that period. With probability 1 – φ it equals a, and with probability 
φ it is zero. Therefore, if I  [0, 1] projects are funded in the first period, only N = (1 – φ)I 
yield positive output in the last period.  
This production structure captures the maturing process of investments, with expenses 
incurred in every period in order to obtain a payoff in the last period, together with the risk 
that setup costs may not be recouped if the technology turns out to be worthless. The 10 
entrepreneurial capital available is K, which is smaller than WF, so that entrepreneurs must 
seek outside financing.  
Agents of the third type are lenders. Their distinguishing feature is that only they have 
the ability to monitor the behavior of entrepreneurs. If investors were to finance entrepreneurs 
directly, they could not prevent them from running away with all of the funds. Lenders, in 
contrast, can prevent the entrepreneurs from absconding with more than a share δ of sales 
revenue. Entrepreneurs can therefore pledge 1 – δ of this revenue to lenders and zero to all 
other agents.
14 I assume that the pledgeable revenue is enough to ensure positive pledgeable 
profits to lenders. A lender will provide the capital needed to start the project, WF – K, as 
well as a line of credit in the second period to pay wages WL′.  
To fund these investments, lenders have capital D in the first period and may receive a 
new infusion D′ in the second period. If they require further financing, they can issue and sell 
securities, guaranteed by the loans they make, totaling S for price Q in the first period, and S′ 
for price Q′ in the second period.
15 These securities pay one unit of capital in the last period, 
if the project is in operation. In the data, lenders include all providers of financing to the 
nonfinancial sectors, including commercial banks, primary issuers of commercial debt, some 
brokers, and others.  
Traders are the fourth and final group of agents. Although they cannot monitor loans, 
together with lenders they have the unique ability to understand and trade the lenders’ 
securities. In particular, in the first period, lenders could try to sell as many securities as they 
wanted whether they had proper backing or not. Traders are the only agents who can verify 
that a recently issued security has proper backing. Traders also observe the realization of 
productivity in the second period, whereas investors do not. They therefore perform the role 
of intermediating between lenders and investors so that the latter have access to the securities. 
In the United States, traders include investment banks, hedge funds, special investment 
vehicles set up by commercial banks, and many others.  
Traders have capital E in the first period, and an additional E
′ is available to them in 
the second period. They can also obtain funds from investors, but I assume that another 
friction prevents investors from effectively owning the traders and acquiring access to their 
information technology. I again use a pledgeability constraint, assuming that investors can 
seize at most a share 1 – μ of the assets of a trader, so that this is the trader’s maximum 
liability.
16 Therefore, in the first period, the trader’s total assets are E/μ, where μ gives the 
inverse of the leverage multiplier. In the second period, because traders enter with assets 
equal to the securities S, and these are marked to market, their entering equity is E + [(1 – 11 
φ)Q′ - Q]S/Q, reflecting the capital gain (or loss) made on these investments. Because the 
trader can get new loans against this marked-to-market equity position, the trader can invest a 
further [(1 – μ)/μ)][(1 – φ)Q′/ Q – 1]S in the second period. This ability to use capital gains to 
boost leverage is also emphasized by Arvind Krishnamurthy (forthcoming) and by Andrei 
Shleifer and Robert Vishny (2009).
17  
 
II.B. Setting up the Model: Financial Markets 
Having presented the agents, I now describe the markets in which they interact in 
each period. In the first period, entrepreneurs need financing to set up their firms. Because of 
the need for monitoring, only lenders are willing to provide them with capital. Lenders 
behave competitively in funding each project, but once a lender is matched with an 
entrepreneur, they stay together until the last period. If lenders do not have enough capital, 
they can issue securities, which only traders will choose to buy since only they can ensure 
that the securities have proper backing. Investors deposit funds with traders. I assume that K 
+ D + E < WF, so that all funds of all agents, including the investors, are required to set up 
all the projects.  
In the second period, entrepreneurs require more capital and obtain it from their line 
of credit with their lender. The lender may issue more securities, and traders can again choose 
to buy them. In this period, however, investors can also buy the preexisting securities, 
because lenders and traders have signaled, by trading them in the first period, that these 
securities are properly backed. However, investors cannot distinguish the securities backed 
by assets with Ai
′= a, from those with Ai
′= 0. Therefore, as long as Q
′ > 1 – φ, they will 
refrain from buying securities directly in this market. Lenders and traders, on the other hand, 
can distinguish between the two types of securities, so if investors stay out, the price of the 
Ai
′= 0 securities is zero, and Q
′ refers to the price of the Ai
′= a securities.  
Finally, in the third period, entrepreneurs obtain the revenue from sales, pay the last-
period workers, and pay back the lenders. The lenders in turn use part of the proceeds to 
repay the holders of securities backed by the loans, and traders return the funds belonging to 
investors. In the end, all agents return their capital to the representative household. All of 
these financial market participants are risk-neutral and aim to maximize their last-period 
payoff.  
Figure 4 summarizes the timing and the flows of funds just described. I assume that 
there is enough liquidity to sustain the social optimum, where all projects get funded and 12 
marginal costs depend only on wages and productivity, which is equivalent to assuming that 
total capital H exceeds the setup and up-front labor costs at the efficient level. The problem I 
focus on here is the allocation of this liquidity, in the presence of the frictions captured by the 
parameters δ, φ, and μ.  
 
[figure 4 about here] 
 
II.C. Closing the Model 
To close the model, I need a few more ingredients, which are spelled out in more 





″ is total final consumption, and Pi
″ is the price of the good. The lender 
and the entrepreneur jointly decide the optimal scale of production for the productive firms in 
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subject to the production function in equation 1 and demand for the good. The optimality 
condition is 
 













″). I assume that m  [1, 2], so that markups are between 0 and 100 
percent, and that (1 – δ)m > 1, so that the pledgeable profits to lenders are positive.  
In a symmetric equilibrium, the production of all firms is the same and equal to Y. 
Total consumption is then C = N
mY, which is increasing in the number of goods produced 
because variety is valued. Moreover, all prices are the same in equilibrium, which, since 
consumption goods and capital have the same price, implies that N
1-mPi 
″= 1, so the static 
cost-of-living price index is constant. Finally, the labor supply function is C
″ = W, which 
follows from assuming log preferences over consumption and linear disutility of labor 
supply.  
Combining all of these equations provides the solution for the following endogenous 13 
variables: total employment in the second and third periods, wages, and the pledgeable 
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II.D. The Equilibrium Conditions in the Financial Markets 
Two restrictions on prices must hold so that there are no arbitrage opportunities that 
would allow for infinite profits. First, since a security bought in the first period for price Q 
will, with probability 1 – φ, be worth Q
′ in the second period, but zero otherwise, and since 
lenders can sell it in the first period and buy it back in the second period, it must be that Q ≤ 
(1 – φ)Q
′. Otherwise, lenders would make infinite expected profits.
18 Second, and similarly, 
because lenders can hold cash between the second and the third period with a guaranteed 
return of 1, it must be that Q
′ ≤ 1.  
I now characterize the equilibrium securities price and investment in the first period. 
In the securities market in the first period, if Q < (1 – φ)Q
′, traders strictly prefer to buy 
securities rather than hold cash, and so their total demand is E/μ. If Q = (1 – φ)Q
′, they are 
indifferent between cash and securities, and so they will be willing to buy any amount of 
securities below E/μ. Turning to the supply of securities, if Q < (1 – φ)Q
′, it equals total 
investment minus the capital of the entrepreneurs and the lenders: WFI – K – D. If Q = (1 – 
φ)Q
′, the lender is indifferent between issuing this amount of securities and any higher 
amount. Equating demand and supply for Q < (1 – φ)Q
′ and substituting for equilibrium 
wages from equation 5 gives the first-period securities market equilibrium condition (SM): 
 
 14 
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In (I, Q) space this defines a vertical line for Q between zero and (1 – φ)Q
′.    
The expected profits of lenders in the first period are Q(1 – φ)Iπ(Q
′, I) – WFI + K. 
There is free entry into this sector, so lenders will enter as long as there are available projects, 
and profits are strictly positive. If Q is above a certain level Q
*, then I = 1, and lenders earn 
positive rents in exchange for their monitoring services.
19 If Q ≤ Q
*, then lenders’ profits are 
driven to zero, so Q(1 – φ)Iπ(Q
′, I) – WFI + K = 0. Solving this equation for I and replacing 
for pledgeable profits from equation 6 gives 
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This is the zero-profits equilibrium condition (ZP), when Q ≤ Q
* and investment is below 1. 
It defines investment implicitly as an increasing function of Q. Intuitively, as the price of 
securities increases, projects become cheaper to finance, so the amount of entrepreneurial 
capital needed per project falls and more projects are funded.  
Turning to the securities market in the second period, if 1 – φ < Q′ < 1, the demand 
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Here the first term is the demand from the new capital, and the second is the extra demand 
from leveraging capital gains. If Q′ = 1, the trader is indifferent between zero and the amount 
in equation 9. As Q′ falls, the expected capital gain for traders is smaller, and so they have 
fewer funds with which to demand securities. If Q′ falls all the way to 1 – φ, then investors 
start buying securities directly, satisfying the supply at that price.  
The supply of securities comes from lenders who need capital to cover their 
outstanding credit lines; thus, it equals (1 – φ)IWL
′  – D
′
  if  Q
′ <  1. Replacing for the 
equilibrium labor and wage from equations 4 and 5 gives the supply function for securities in 





















This is increasing in Q
′, since a higher price of securities implies a lower marginal cost of 
production and therefore an increase in the scale of each firm. This requires more funds to 
finance operations, and hence higher credit lines and more securities issued. When Q
′ = 1, the 
lenders become indifferent between supplying this and any higher amount.  
Equations 7 through 10 provide four conditions to determine the four endogenous 
variables: the equilibrium price of securities in the first and second periods (Q
 and Q
′), the 
amount of investment in the first period (I), and the scale of operations and funding in the 
second period (S
′). Together these define the equilibrium in this economy.
20 There are three 
possible equilibria, which I describe next.  
 
II.E. The Three Equilibrium Cases 
The first case is the efficient economy, where, in spite of the financial frictions, all 
projects are still funded (I = 1), and financing does not add to the marginal cost of firms: Q
′ = 
1. One can show that this will be the case if δ, μ, and φ are each below some threshold. 
Intuitively, if δ is not too high, then the lenders are able to appropriate enough of the 
entrepreneurs’ revenue so that their profits are high enough and they will wish to finance all 
the projects. If μ is low enough, the friction impeding the flow of funds from investors to 
traders is not too severe, and so their funds can satiate the market for securities. Finally, if φ 
is low enough, the expected profits of lenders in the first period are high, inducing full 
investment, and investors put a high lower bound on the price of securities in the second 
period.  
The second case is the other extreme, that of a catastrophic economy, where the price 
of securities in the second period has fallen to 1 – φ. Investors start buying securities directly, 
but because they cannot distinguish profitable from unprofitable assets, for each dollar they 
spend on a worthwhile security, φ/(1 – φ) dollars buy a worthless security, squandering their 
funds and destroying resources. This low price of securities implies that the marginal cost of 
production (1 – v + v/Q
′) is high, so that each firm will operate at a small, inefficient scale. 
And as Q falls even lower, below (1 – φ)
2, the cost of financing to set up projects in the first 16 
period becomes very high, and few firms are set up in the first place.  
In between these two extremes is the constrained economy, depicted in figure 5 As 
the top panel of figure 5 shows, the equilibrium price of securities and the level of investment 
in the first period are determined, taking as given the price of securities in the second period. 
The vertical line is the SM condition in equation 7, and the upward-sloping curve is the ZP 
condition in equation 8. The bottom panel shows the equilibrium price in the second period 
and the scale of the projects, taking as given the price and investment from the previous 
period. The zigzag line depicts the demand function in equation 9, and the curve is the supply 
function in equation 10. In this economy there is an extensive-margin inefficiency, as I < 1 in 
equilibrium. Traders do not have enough assets, because of either low capital or tight 
leverage constraints imposed by investors, so the price of securities Q is below Q
*, making 
the up-front cost of investing too high relative to future revenue. There is also an intensive-
margin inefficiency, since Q
′  < 1, and so the marginal costs of production exceed W/a. 
Operating firms will hire too little labor and produce too little output, because there is too 




[figure 5 about here] 
 
Intuitively, for the economy to operate efficiently, investors’ capital must reach 
entrepreneurs either directly from lenders or through the securities market from traders and 
investors. In the efficient economy, this happens because entrepreneurs have all the capital 
they need to set up and operate projects. In the constrained economy, leverage constraints on 
traders are too tight, so that there are insufficient funds in the securities markets in both 
periods, and the pledgeability constraint and technological risk prevent lenders’ capital from 
being enough. In the catastrophic economy, investors enter the securities market directly, but 
do so with great waste since they are unable to pick securities. There is severe mispricing and 
misallocation of capital, as worthless and worthwhile investments face the same marginal 
cost of capital in an inefficient pooling equilibrium.
22  
To understand better the role of each of the three frictions in the model, consider what 
happens in equilibrium as each is shut down. First, if all projects are productive (φ = 0), then 
there is no “lemons” problem in the securities market. This implies that the knowledge 
traders use in picking securities is no longer valuable, and investors can buy securities 
directly from lenders. Since there is no limit to the amount of securities that lenders can issue, 17 
and since investors have all the necessary capital to fund all projects and run them efficiently, 
the only equilibrium is the efficient one. Second, assume that traders can no longer abscond 
with capital without being detected (μ = 0). In this case investors will be willing to invest all 
their funds with traders, who in turn will buy all the securities issued by lenders. Again, the 
unique equilibrium is the efficient case. Finally, if the banks have a perfect monitoring 
technology, they can reap all of the revenue from projects (δ = 0). Lenders will then be very 
willing to lend, a condition reflected in figure 5 by Q
* being quite low, making it more likely 
that the efficient equilibrium obtains. It is still possible, however, that the friction in the 
leveraging of traders is so strong that they cannot obtain from investors even the small 
amount of funds required to fund all projects, and so the constrained equilibrium persists if 
the SM line is to the left of I = 1.   
 
III. Interpreting the Federal Reserve’s Actions: Credit Policy 
 
In terms of the model just described, the financial events and crisis described in 
section I.A can be interpreted as a combination of two effects. First, the downgrading of 
many securities, following downward revisions of the value of the assets backing them, can 
be interpreted as an increase in φ in the model. Second, the withdrawal of funds from the 
financial sector and the fears about the solvency of many financial institutions can be 
interpreted as an increase in μ. Both of these changes can be interpreted as technological 
changes, or instead as changes in beliefs about the quality of assets. The economy in 2007-09 
can then be seen as moving to a constrained equilibrium like that depicted in figure 5, or 
perhaps even as on the way to the catastrophic equilibrium.  
A policymaker would like to intervene to correct this serious misallocation of funds. 
Credit policy in this economy consists of transferring the capital trapped in investors’ hands 
to other agents, or alternatively, issuing more claims on final output (and correspondingly 
taxing more consumption in the final period). What the central bank can achieve with these 
actions depends on what is assumed about its knowledge and skills.  
One extreme is the case where the central bank has no special powers beyond those 
available to private investors. In terms of the model, this translates into the central bank 
having neither the ability to monitor loans, nor the know-how to pick securities, nor the 
power to seize more than a share of the traders’ assets. In this case any injection of credit by 18 
the central bank in the market is equivalent to an increase in the capital of investors M. This 
does not affect any of the equilibrium conditions in the model, since the problem to be solved 
is not a lack of funds but their misallocation. Worse, if the central bank misguidedly tries to 
pick securities, invest in traders, or make loans directly to entrepreneurs, the model predicts 
that its suboptimal behavior will lead to possibly heavy losses, as money is absconded and 
investments turn sour.  
At the other extreme, consider the case where the central bank can become a lender, 
able to monitor the behavior of borrowers and ensure that the funds it lends are put to good 
use. Then, by lending the needed funds to entrepreneurs, the policymaker could reach the 
social optimum, with no intervention by financial firms. This seems unrealistic and indeed 
results in absurd predictions: if the central bank could lend as effectively as anyone else, why 
have a financial system at all? Three intermediate cases are both more interesting and more 
realistic.  
 
III.A. The Central Bank as a Senior Secure Investor 
In the first intermediate case, I assume that the central bank has the ability to make 
loans to financial institutions that are sure to be fully repaid. In the model this maps into the 
policymaker both being able to distinguish good projects from bad and having some 
monitoring technology that ensures that lenders repay the central bank out of the revenue 
from projects before they or the securities holders get paid. In reality this might be achieved 
by imposing the condition that central bank loans are senior to those of other creditors, or by 
the central bank using its regulatory power.  
In the model a transfer of funds X from the central bank to lenders in the first period 
raises their initial capital from D to D + X, while leaving their profits unchanged as X is 
returned in the final period.
23 Figure 6 depicts the effect this has on the equilibrium. The SM 
line in the first period shifts to the right, leading to an increase in investment and a rise in the 
price of securities. The extensive margin moves closer to the efficient level. These changes in 
turn lead to an increase in the supply of securities in the second period, since I is higher, so 
that the amount needed for the credit lines rises, as well as to a decline in demand, since the 
increase in Q lowers expected capital gains for traders. Therefore, the price of securities in 
the second period unambiguously falls, raising marginal costs and leading to a worsening of 
the intensive margin. Second-round effects then follow as the lower Q
′ lowers the expected 19 
profits of lenders, shifting the zero-profit condition to the left and lowering investment, and 
so on. As a result of the central bank’s actions, more firms are in operation, but each at a 
smaller, inefficient scale.  
 
[figure 6 about here] 
 
For comparison, consider what happens if the first-period loans X are made to traders 
instead, as also portrayed in figure 6. Their total assets in the first period increase to E/μ + X, 
which has exactly the same effect on the first-period equilibrium as the transfer of funds to 
lenders in the previous scenario. However, in the second-period market, the increase in the 
assets of traders implies that they will have higher capital gains. Because traders mark their 
equity to market, they now have an extra source of funds with which to demand securities in 
the second period, so that the demand curve will be to the right of that in the previous case (in 
the figure this is drawn as unchanged from the initial case). Therefore, the price of second-
period securities falls less than it did in that case. This intervention does not give rise to the 
same intensive-margin inefficiency that the loan to lenders did.  
Alternatively, consider the case where the central bank lends to traders or lenders in 
the second period rather than the first. Examination of the two equilibrium conditions, 
equations 9 and 10, shows that E
′/μ and D
′ enter symmetrically; it follows that loans to traders 
and loans to lenders would have an equivalent effect, raising Q
′ and improving intensive-
margin efficiency. At the same time, they would lower investment in the first period (see 
equation 7) and so worsen the extensive margin.
24 Note that the crucial difference between 
the first and the second periods in the model is whether the securities are coming due next 
period or not. The indifference between lending funds to traders and lending them to lenders 
applies only to the securities that are about to mature; for all other securities, loans to traders 
are more effective because they affect the traders’ equity and leverage in future periods.  
The theory therefore suggests that providing funds to traders of new securities is more 
effective than providing them to lenders. The intuition is that, by accruing capital gains, 
traders can use increases in their equity to raise their leverage and draw more of the plentiful 
funds in the hands of investors to where they are needed in the securities markets. For the 
Federal Reserve, however, it is more natural to extend loans to commercial banks, as this 
involves little departure from its usual procedures. The creation of the popular 90-day loans 
under the TAF, which banks can use instead of the overnight loans available in the federal 
funds market, is an example of directing funds to lenders. Programs such as the TSLF, the 20 
PDCF, and the TALF are closer to the injection of funds into traders that the model 
recommends.  
 
III.B. The Central Bank as a Buyer of Securities 
Next, consider the stricter case where the central bank has the know-how to evaluate 
securities in the second period, distinguishing those that are associated with profitable firms 
from those that are worthless. In this case the central bank can use its funds X  to buy 
securities directly, shifting the demand curve in the bottom panel of figure 5 to the right. In 
the model this is precisely equivalent to lending funds to traders or lenders in the second 
period, as was just discussed. It is less effective than lending to traders in the first period 
because it does not draw investors’ funds into the market.  
The Federal Reserve followed this path for the latter path of 2008 through the CPFF. 
This agrees with the model’s prescriptions, since it has the same effect on the equilibrium as 
loans to traders, but the latter in reality are likely easier to manage and less risky. Moreover, 
in practice, once the central bank starts picking which securities to buy, it opens itself to 
political and lobbying pressures that may prove dangerous.  
 
III.C. The Central Bank as an Equity Investor 
Through its public-private partnerships and its capital stakes in banks, the Treasury 
has become an equity holder in many financial firms. The Federal Reserve has not done so 
explicitly, although its uncomfortable actions in support of the rescue of Bear Stearns and 
AIG make it close to being a de facto investor.
25  
In terms of the model, this case differs from the previous one because the purchases of 
securities by the traders increase not by X but rather by X/μ. That is, with the central bank 
now taking an equity stake, the new funds can be leveraged up, drawing more capital from 
investors into the securities market. In terms of the model, this is unambiguously better than 
providing loans, but only if the central bank can prevent its new partners from absconding 
with a share μ of the assets.
26 Moreover, in real life it requires that the government behave 
like a profit-maximizing shareholder in the firms. Both conditions may not be met, and both 
surely come with some risk.  
 21 
IV. Interpreting the Federal Reserve’s Actions: Quantitative 
Policy 
 
The large increase in outstanding reserves and in the size of the Federal Reserve’s 
balance sheet can cause worries. If “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary 
phenomenon,” as in Milton Friedman’s famous dictum, then the creation of so much money 
in the past two years might indicate that inflation is to come.  
However, there are good reasons, both empirical and theoretical, to be skeptical of the 
tight link between money and inflation that a strict monetarist stance would suggest. The 
attempts at money targeting in the United States and the United Kingdom in the early 1980s 
did not succeed at achieving the target levels, and even though Japan in the 1990s increased 
reserves on a scale similar to that in the United States recently, deflation persisted. 
Conventional models of inflation predict that reserves are irrelevant for the setting of interest 
rates or the control of inflation.
27 This section discusses these theoretical arguments and 
examines to what extent the crisis may require their modification.  
 
IV.A. A Simple Model of Price-Level Determination 
Consider the following model of price-level (Pt) determination with no uncertainty: 
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Equation 11 is the Euler equation for consumption, which equates the real interest rate (the 
gross nominal rate 1 + it divided by gross inflation Pt+1/Pt) to the discounted change in the 
marginal utility of consumption, which with log utility equals consumption growth. Equation 22 
12 is the demand for real reserves (Mt/Pt). It depends negatively on the opportunity cost of 
holding reserves instead of bonds, which is the difference in the interest rates paid on the two 
assets (it – it
m). When this difference is zero and the other determinants of the demand for 
reserves are held fixed, the private sector is indifferent toward holding any amount of 
reserves above some satiation level.
28  
The next two equations refer to the behavior of the Treasury. Equation 13 is the 
government budget constraint. On the left-hand side are government spending (Gt) and 
interest payments on outstanding bonds (Bt). On the right-hand side are revenue from taxes 
(Tt), transfers from the Federal Reserve (Vt), and issuances of new debt. Equation 14 is the 
market clearing condition for government debt, which may be held either by the Federal 
Reserve (Bt
F) or by private agents (Bt
P).  
The final two equations apply to the central bank. It makes transfers to the Treasury, 
pays interest on reserves, and buys either government securities or private assets (Kt). These 
uses of funds are financed by issuing new reserves and by the interest collected on the 
government bonds and on the portfolio of private securities with return qt. The last equation 
is the policy rule for the interest rate, with χ > 1 and policy choices xt.
29  
To focus on the price level, I take consumption as exogenous, and to focus on 
monetary policy, I treat government spending as also exogenous. The Federal Reserve’s 
policy is captured by its interest rate policy (its choices of interest rates {xt, i t, it
m}), its 
quantitative policy (its choices regarding the amount of reserves and transfers to the Treasury 
{Mt, Vt}), and its credit policy (its choices regarding  what assets {Bt
F, Kt} to hold). The 
Treasury’s policy is captured by its choices regarding taxation and debt issuance {Tt, Bt}.
30 
The goal is to determine the price level Pt as a function of these nine policy variables, subject 
to the six equations above and a set of initial and terminal conditions.
31 A policy regime can 
be defined as a choice of which of these policy variables will be exogenously chosen and 
which must be accommodated endogenously.  
 
IV.B. The Precrisis Policy Regime 
For most of the last 20 years, the press releases and commentary following meetings 
of the FOMC have focused on the current choice of innovations to the short-term interest rate 
xt, and its likely future path. Combining equations 11 and 16 and solving forward, the unique 
bounded solution for the price level is  23 
 
(17)    
 
Regardless of any other policy choice, interest rate policy alone determines inflation. As long 
as the other policy choices respect the constraints imposed by the equilibrium in equations 11 
through 16, understanding and forecasting inflation involves focusing solely on the target 
rates announced by the FOMC. However the other variables are determined, it is the federal 
funds rate that determines inflation, according to the model.  
Turning to the other variables, the policy rule in equation 16 determines endogenously 
the observed short-term interest rate it. The other exogenous interest rate is it
m, the interest 
rate on reserves, which before October 2008 was zero. The money demand equation 
(equation 12) then implied that total reserves Mt were determined endogenously. Therefore, 
there was no independent quantitative policy, as the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance 
sheet had to accommodate the fluctuations in the demand for reserves.  
As for credit policy, before 2007 the Federal Reserve chose to hold almost no private 
securities (Kt ≈ 0) and to hold government bonds roughly in line with the amount of reserves 
in circulation (Bt
F ≈ Mt). The Federal Reserve’s budget constraint, equation 15, reduces to 
 
(18)  Vt ≈ it-1Mt-1    
 
in steady state. With these policy choices, the Federal Reserve obtained net income from 
seigniorage every period, rebating almost all of it to the Treasury to keep its accounting 
capital roughly constant.  
Finally, turning to fiscal policy, combining the result in equation 18 with the 
Treasury’s budget constraint in equation 13, the market clearing condition for bonds in 
equation 14, and the transversality conditions gives 
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The fiscal authorities can choose a path for deficits subject to the intertemporal solvency 24 
constraint in equation 20, and the total outstanding U.S. debt evolves endogenously to satisfy 
equation 19.  
Monetary policy has been independent of fiscal policy in that the Federal Reserve 
chooses  xt taking only its mandate into account, regardless of the fiscal choices of the 
Treasury. Fiscal policy is dependent on monetary policy insofar as changes in reserves will 
affect the flow of seigniorage to the Treasury, but since the term ΔMt+j has in the history of 
the Federal Reserve been tiny relative to the government’s operating balance Pt+j(Tt+j – Gt+j), 
this dependence has been close to irrelevant.  
Until recently, both the independence of the central bank to set interest rates and 
control inflation and the accommodation of reserves to interest rate policy were seen as 
hallmarks of good monetary policy.
32 Some have even argued that this policy regime partly 
explains the decline in macroeconomic volatility in the two decades before the crisis.
33  
 
IV.C. Is the Pre-2007 Status Quo Sustainable? 
The crisis has brought significant changes in monetary policy. However, these by 
themselves do not imply that the determination of the price level must be different from what 
was just described. According to the model, monetary policy can still independently choose 
the path for interest rates {xt}, and this alone still suffices to determine current and future 
inflation.  
The changes in policy only have to affect variables in the system, other than the 
inflation. First, because it can now pay interest on reserves, the central bank can choose 
exogenously either it – it
m or the quantity of reserves Mt. Unlike before, when the interest rate 
on reserves was fixed at zero, the central bank may now wish to set a target for the amount of 
reserves in the market, as long as it adjusts it
m accordingly. Moreover, if it continues the 
current policy of setting it
m = it, the central bank can also target any level of reserves above 
the satiation level (Mt/Pt)
*. This policy has at least two virtues. First, it allows the central 
bank to inject as much liquidity as necessary to sustain the efficient equilibrium described in 
the previous section. Second, it eliminates the implicit tax on reserves that existed before 
2008 and that Friedman (1960, 1969) and Marvin Goodfriend (2002), among many others, 
had criticized well before the crisis for being inefficient.  
Turning to credit policy, the Federal Reserve can gradually sell its holdings of private 
securities, receiving in return government bonds until these are again approximately equal to 25 
reserves. The only substantial change is that now, with the removal of the implicit tax on 
reserves, transfers to the Treasury become zero. Since they were small to start with, this 
should have no visible effect on government finances and fiscal policy. The balance sheet of 
the Federal Reserve can stay larger than before, with reserves beyond the satiation level at 
whatever amount is supplied.  
The announced intentions of the Federal Reserve are roughly consistent with the 
scenario just described. The Federal Reserve has been firm in its commitment to set interest 
rates so as to control inflation and to maintain its independence.
34 Moreover, there is no 
indication that the decision to pay interest on reserves will be reversed. The Federal Reserve 
has also indicated that it would like to lower its holdings of private securities to as close to 
zero as possible as soon as it can.
35  
One source of uncertainty is what the Federal Reserve will do about quantitative 
policy in the aftermath of the crisis. The Federal Reserve has indicated that once it becomes 
possible, it will lower reserves and reduce the size of its balance sheet.
36 The theory in this 
and the previous sections suggests that this is unnecessary, as there is nothing wrong with 
keeping reserves at high levels. Importantly, this much higher level of reserves is not 
inflationary. Once the Federal Reserve started paying interest on reserves, eliminating the 
implicit tax on reserves, the old money multiplier that linked reserves to the price level broke 
down. 
  
IV.D. The Capital and Fiscal Risks to the Status Quo 
The main risk to the scenario just described comes from the Federal Reserve’s flow of 
funds in equation 13. Now that interest is being paid on reserves, and now that reserves have 
more than doubled, the term it-1
mMt-1 can become significant as soon as it-1
m increases from 
zero in tandem with the federal funds rate. Moreover, with the Federal Reserve holding a 
significant amount of private securities, the return on these securities may prove negative, 
lowering revenue by the amount qt-1Kt-1.
37 How can the Federal Reserve make up for this 
budget shortfall?  
There are two separate issues, one real and one illusory. To start with the latter, if the 
Federal Reserve suffers significant losses on its portfolio, its accounting capital may become 
negative. If the Federal Reserve were an ordinary company, this would mean that it was 
bankrupt, as its liabilities would exceed its assets. However, the Federal Reserve is not an 26 
ordinary company, because its liabilities are special. Negative capital is a problem for an 
ordinary company because it lacks the assets to pay its creditors if they all demand to be paid 
at once. But the Federal Reserve’s two main creditors are currency holders and banks holding 
reserves. Neither can show up at the central bank and demand to be paid with assets. 
Currency issued by the Federal Reserve is legal tender, and the holding of reserves can be 
required by law. This means that there cannot be a run of creditors on the Federal Reserve. 
Thus, the accounting capital of the Federal Reserve is a vacuous concept. If there is a 
concern, it is because, as Tiago Berriel and Saroj Bhattarai (2009) document, most central 
banks, including the Federal Reserve, seem to worry about their capital. As those authors 
show, if the central bank worries about trying to maintai a target level of capital in its balance 
sheet, this will move the path of interest rates away from what would be desirable.  
The real issue is whether there is a need for outside funds. The Federal Reserve, like 
any other agent, has a budget constraint. Rearranging equation 13, 
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The issue is that the left-hand side may become large, requiring additional funds on the right-
hand side to maintain equality. The five terms on the right-hand side give the five possible 
sources of these funds. The first of these is the interest collected on the government bonds the 
central bank holds. Because it-1 ≥ it-1
m, any budget shortfall that arises from paying interest on 
reserves is at most equal to the interest rate times the difference between reserves outstanding 
and government securities held. The Federal Reserve’s balance sheet on August 19, 2009, 
reported in table 1, shows that at that date, even if the annual interest rate were as high as 5 
percent, this would amount to just over $10 billion a year.
38 If the Federal Reserve exchanges 
a few of its private assets for government securities, as it already plans to do by the end of 
2009, it can reach the normal state where Bt
F > Mt and the interest on reserves is more than 
covered by the interest received on government securities.  
The danger therefore comes almost entirely from the possibility of large losses on the 
central bank’s holdings of private assets. The second and third terms on the right-hand side of 
equation 21 show that the Federal Reserve can sell its assets—either the government 
securities or the private assets—to cover these losses. This cannot go on forever, as the 
Federal Reserve will eventually run out of assets. But considering the over $2 trillion in 
assets that the Federal Reserve holds, this would require quite catastrophic losses for a 27 
sustained period.
39  
Another option is to print money or raise reserves, raising Mt. If the economy is 
already satiated with reserves, this extra printing of money will have no effect on the 
macroeconomy, as banks will be happy to accept these extra reserves as payment. There is no 
private or social cost to creating excess and possibly idle reserves.
40   
Only the final option is more troublesome. To pay for its budget shortfall, the Federal 
Reserve might choose to rely on a steady stream of financing from the Treasury (Vt < 0). The 
financial independence of the Federal Reserve from Congress has been a guarantee of its 
overall independence.
41 Should transfers from the taxpayer to the Federal Reserve, requiring 
the approval of Congress, become a regular occurrence, political pressures on the setting of 
interest rates would become inevitable. There is a real danger that this would lead to 
permanent increases in inflation in exchange for only short-lived boosts to output, as the U.S. 
economy falls into the time-inconsistency trap described by Finn Kydland and Edward 
Prescott (1977).  
In the extreme, this loss of independence could even trigger a change in the policy 
regime. In particular, consider the scenario where Congress limits the fiscal plans of the 
executive branch by imposing a target for government debt as a ratio to GDP (or 
consumption): Bt/Ct. The Treasury could accommodate this target by cutting deficits. But it 
might instead choose a value for nominal deficits exogenously, consistent with an 
equilibrium.
42 The equilibrium price level would be 
 
(22)      
 
and inflation would be determined solely by the government’s fiscal choices. The Federal 
Reserve would then be forced to accommodate these fiscal policies by effectively handing 
over control of nominal interest rates, with xt determined endogenously to satisfy 
 
(23)  xt = Δ ln (Pt+1) – χΔ ln (Pt) + Δ ln (Ct+1) – ln β. 
   
 
This fiscalist determination of inflation requires the Treasury to be dominant over the Federal 
Reserve in setting policy—a situation that the literature has described as the fiscal authorities 28 
being active and the central bank passive.
43  
 
V. Interpreting the Federal Reserve’s Actions: Interest Rate 
Policy 
 
A key feature of the crisis of 2007-09 is that short-term interest rates have been 
almost zero. This is only the second time that this has happened in the last century in the 
United States, the other being the period of the Great Depression in the 1930s. Many 
economists refer to this situation as a “liquidity trap,” since zero is the lowest possible target 
for the federal funds rate, and transitory increases in the money supply lead investors, now 
indifferent between money and bonds, to simply substitute one for the other. Conventional 
monetary policy appears powerless.  
An extensive literature argues that this appearance is incorrect. Motivated by the 
experience of the Japan in the 1990s, researchers over the past decade have characterized the 
challenges in a liquidity trap and offered some policy advice to confront them.
44 They argue 
that in a liquidity trap, not only is interest rate policy not ineffective, but indeed choosing the 
right path for interest rates becomes particularly important.  
To understand this point, recall the Fisher equation equating the real interest rate, rt, to 
the nominal interest rate, it, minus expected inflation, Et(Δ Pt+1): 
 
(24)  rt = it – Et[Δ ln (Pt+1)]. 
   
 
Recall further that the (linearized) Euler equation with log utility for optimal consumption 
states that expected consumption growth between date t and date t + s is equal to the sum of 
short-term real interest rates across the two periods: 
 
(25)    
 
Intuitively, the higher is the long-term real interest rate, which is equal to the expected path of 29 
short-term real interest rates, the greater the incentive to save, postponing consumption today 
for consumption in the future.  
The challenge for interest rate policy is that the financial crisis and its spillover to the 
real economy have led to a fall in the real interest rate needed for the economy to respond 
efficiently. If inflation expectations remain stable and low, equation 24 may imply that the 
nominal interest rate would have to become negative to generate the needed real interest rate. 
But because the nominal interest rate has a zero lower bound, this cannot happen, and 
consequently real interest rates remain too high.
45 Equation 25 then implies that these 
excessively high real interest rates drive down current consumption, worsening the recession.  
The “Brookings answer” to this problem was given in two papers published in this 
journal. First, Paul Krugman (1998) emphasized that monetary policy is particularly potent in 
this situation if it can steer inflation expectations. The way out of the trap is to raise inflation 
expectations by whatever means possible, so that the short-term real interest rate can fall, 
encouraging consumption. Then, Gauti Eggertsson and Michael Woodford (2003) identified a 
practical way for the central bank to affect inflation expectations, by committing to keep 
nominal interest rates low into the future, even after the shocks leading to the crisis have 
subsided. This would lower expected future short-term real interest rates, producing the fall 
in long-term real interest rates needed to drive real activity up.  
There are several other ways to raise inflation expectations, bring down real interest 
rates, and stimulate the economy. Devaluing the currency is one, and another is to purchase 
government debt with a permanent increase in the money supply that is allowed to persist 
after the crisis has passed. A more institutional approach that would prevent the problem 
from appearing in the first place would be for the central bank to announce a price-level 
target, since this would require that current deflation be offset by higher future inflation to get 
back on target. A final alternative would be for the central bank to commit to lower long-term 
nominal interest rates, as this would be equivalent to committing to a lower path of short-term 
rates.
46 It is important to note that these are not alternatives to increasing inflation 
expectations by committing to low nominal interest rates into the future. Rather, they are 
different ways to implement the same policy, a decrease in real interest rates, through its 
relation with other macroeconomic variables..  
How do the Federal Reserve’s actions compare with these theoretical suggestions? 
Although the Federal Reserve has not announced a commitment to allow higher inflation than 
average in the near future, in the way that a price-level target would suggest, it has announced 
its commitment to do what it can to prevent deflation. The FOMC announcements following 30 
every meeting so far in 2009 have stated the intention to keep the target for the federal funds 
rate at zero for an extended period. These are signs that the advice of Krugman, Eggertsson, 
and Woodford is being followed, but only halfway, as the Federal Reserve has also signaled 
that it will not tolerate either temporary or permanent above-normal inflation.
47  
Meanwhile the Federal Reserve has made no commitment to any of the other 
alternatives. First, announcing a devaluation of the dollar is not an option, since this is the 
domain of the Treasury, not the Federal Reserve. Second, there has been little purchasing of 
government debt: the dollar value of Treasury-issued securities plus agency debt held by the 
Federal Reserve in August 2009, at $847.9 billion, was not dramatically greater than the 
$778.9 billion it held in January 2007. Although the Federal Reserve has announced that it 
will expand its purchases of government bonds substantially in the coming months, it has also 
indicated that this might be temporary, as it returns to a balance sheet similar in size to that in 
the past once the crisis subsides. Third, the change in the maturity composition of these 
securities toward longer-term bonds is consistent with an effort to lower long-term interest 
rates, but there is little evidence that this portfolio shift can have any effect beyond what the 
announcement of lower future short-term interest rates will achieve.  
A crucial part of the Federal Reserve’s policy is its future actions, after the crisis 
subsides, and these remain to be seen. In particular, the FOMC has not clearly stated that it 
will keep interest rates at zero even after the financial shock disappears, an important 
component of optimal policy according to the theory just discussed.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper has provided a critical analysis of the Federal Reserve’s policy actions of 
the past two years. It has catalogued monetary policy into three types according to whether it 
affects interest rates, the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, or the allocation of its 
credit across different assets.  
With regard to interest rate policy, the Federal Reserve has followed the advice 
derived from theory by committing to fight deflation and to keep nominal interest rates at 
zero for the foreseeable future. It has deviated from the theoretical recommendations by not 
committing to higher-than-average inflation in the future, and especially by not providing a 
clear signal that it will keep nominal interest rates low for some time even after the crisis is 
over.  31 
With regard to quantitative policy, at least theoretically there is no reason why the 
path of short-term nominal interest rates should stop determining inflation, or why the 
conventional separation between monetary and fiscal policy should have to be revisited. Both 
of these features have been lauded as hallmarks of the success of monetary policy in the past 
two decades. However, the combination of an expansion in the Federal Reserve’s balance 
sheet, the introduction of interest payments on reserves, and the holding by the Federal 
Reserve of assets with risky returns does pose a danger. The Federal Reserve might face 
significant budget shortfalls, and overreacting to these may lead to the central bank 
surrendering its independence from fiscal policy, potentially compromising both of the 
hallmarks above.  
Finally, regarding credit policy, the paper has introduced a new model of how the 
financial market allocates funds to investment and of the credit frictions in that process. I 
have considered the merits of different interventions as indicated by the model, conditioned 
on alternative beliefs about the knowledge and power of the Federal Reserve. The model 
suggests that using senior loans to inject funds into firms that trade asset-backed securities 
can restore liquidity in all financial markets. Theoretically, the size of the required 
government intervention is smaller with this policy than if instead policymakers lend funds to 
the originators of loans or buy securities directly, and may be more robust than taking equity 
stakes in financial firms. The Federal Reserve’s actions over the past two years have included 
almost all of these alternatives. Perhaps this was wise, since so little is known in this area. 
What is more likely is that looking back in a few years and using either the model in this 
paper or others that will follow, some of the Federal Reserve’s credit policies will be seen as 
ineffective or even harmful.  
Although the paper has touched on many different topics, models, and policies, I have 
not addressed every facet of the crisis or of the role of monetary policy during a crisis. For 
example, I have considered neither aggregate risk and changes in risk spreads nor the 
potential for bank runs.
48 Nor have I discussed the role of foreign investors and the external 
deficit, or compared the Federal Reserve’s actions with those of other central banks around 
the world. Finally, I have not emphasized the political economy trade-offs that the different 
policies involve, which may become important in the near future.  
This interpretation of the Federal Reserve’s actions has thus enjoyed the privileges of 
being selective in the choice of topics and of having some hindsight in addressing them. 
Neither was available to the Federal Reserve and other central banks in the past two years. 
Moreover, as is almost always the case when an academic writes about policy, the tone and 32 
spirit of this interpretation are based implicitly on the premise that theory runs ahead of 
practice. The events of the past two years have been humbling on that score, providing a 
lesson to academics like me that we must be less confident about this premise than usual. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Details of the Model 
 
This appendix complements the setup and solution of the model described in the text. 
 
 
A.1. The Problem of the Representative Consumer-Worker 
 
The consumer-worker in the model faces the following optimization problem: 
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Expression A.1 gives the consumer-worker’s preferences. Utility is logarithmic in total 
consumption and linear in labor supplied; these functional forms make the algebra easier.  
Equation A.2 is the budget constraint. On the left-hand side are the uses of funds in 
the third period, namely, to purchase the consumption good from the firms and to pay taxes 
H
″. On the right-hand side are the sources of the funds: wages received from labor and 
income received (“payoff”) from the four financial participants in the last period. Because 
utility is linear in labor supply in all three periods, there is a single wage. Since capital is 
transferred across periods at zero net return, this is the single intertemporal budget constraint.  
Finally, equation A.3 is the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator mapping the consumption of 
different varieties onto the final composite goods, with elasticity of substitution m/(m – 1).  
The optimality conditions are 
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A.2. The Problem of Agents in the Financial Market 
 
Investors start in period 1 with capital M. Their budget constraints for each period are 
(A.7)  I Inv H M     
(A.8)  I I Inv H Sec H
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In words, in the first period they invest Inv in traders and keep Ht in capital. In the second 
period they invest an additional Inv′, buy securities in amount Sec′, and keep the remainder 
H1
’ in capital. In the third period they receive back their previous investments from traders at 
zero net return and receive the payoff of the 1 – φ securities they bought in the previous 
period that were productive, ending with total capital HI
″.  34 
Entrepreneurs start with capital K. The aggregate budget constraint (summed over all 
entrepreneurs) in each period is 
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In the first period entrepreneurs use their own capital and the loans from lenders to pay their 
fixed costs, with HE left over. In the second period they have this capital plus new loans, 
which they spend on the operating costs of their firms, leaving HE
′ for the next period. 
Finally, in the last period, they receive the share δ of revenue and end with total capital HE
″.  
The budget constraints of the lending sector in the aggregate in each period are 
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In the first period lenders start with capital D and obtain extra capital S by selling securities. 
They use this to make loans and retain a nonnegative amount of capital HL. In the next period 
they receive new capital, sell new securities to traders and investors, and can use this and the 
capital saved from last period to increase their lending, through the credit lines extended to 
the entrepreneurs, while potentially holding some capital for the following period. Finally, in 
the last period, they receive a share 1 – δ of the firms’ revenue and must pay back the holders 
of securities backed by the loans to the surviving firms.  
Finally, the aggregate budget constraints of the traders in each period are 
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In the first period traders buy securities S and hold capital HT, using their starting funds E 
plus Inv received from investors. The same applies in the second period. In the third period 
the investments are repaid at zero net cost, and the securities earn a nonzero return. The 
pledgeability constraints on investment are 
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The second term in the pledgeability constraint in the second period is the capital gain on the 
securities bought in the previous period. The possible absconding of traders with the assets is 
not included in these constraints, because this never happens in equilibrium.  

















T are all greater than or equal to zero. 
 
A.3. Optimality Conditions for Financial Agents 
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Each of the risk-neutral financial agents wants to maximize its final capital. I focus here on 
the case where, in equilibrium, there is some inefficiency, so Q < 1 – φ, and Q
′ < 1. The other 
cases are similar.  
Investors want to maximize H
″
I. As long as Q
′ < 1 – φ, they will buy no securities, 
Sec
′ = 0, since doing so leads to a negative return. Moreover, they are indifferent between 
holding capital and placing it with traders, and I assume that they invest as much as they can, 
subject to the pledgeability constraint.  
Entrepreneurs earn strictly positive profits. Therefore, the return from applying their 
capital in the firm exceeds that from keeping it idle, and HE = H
′
E = 0. The optimal number of 
projects started and the optimal amount of labor hired are determined in section II.C.  
Lenders are willing to sell securities at a positive return to traders, and therefore they 
must not be holding capital at zero return, so HL = H
′
L = 0. The optimal choice of Loan and 
Loan
′ was determined in section II.C, and the optimal issues of S and S
′ were stated in section 
II.D and derive from the budget constraints.  
Traders earn a positive net return on the securities. Since capital earns a zero return, 
they choose HT = H
′
T = 0. Since they pay zero return to investors, they will want to draw 
funds from them to the extent possible. The pledgeability constraints therefore hold with 
equality. Combining the pledgeability and budget constraints gives the demand for securities 
in the text, S = E/μ and S
′= E
′ /μ + [(1 – μ)/μ][(1 – φ)Q
′/Q – 1]E /μ.  
 
A.4. Market Clearing Conditions and Walras’ Law 
 
I start by summing the budget constraints for the four financial agents, to obtain the market 
clearing conditions for capital within the financial market. This gives 
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The first two conditions determine the capital left over with investors at the end of the first 
two periods. They show that as long as M is large enough, HI > 0 and H′I > 0, an assumption 
that I maintain throughout the analysis. This in turn translates into an assumption for total 
initial capital, since the market clearing condition for capital between the representative 
household and financial institutions in the first period is 
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The payoff from financial firms to households in the last period is 
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where the second equation comes from the market clearing condition for capital in the third 
period, and the third from using the market clearing conditions in the other periods. Noting 
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expression becomes the budget constraint of the representative consumer. This verifies 
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1Operating procedures for the discount window changed in January 2003, and therefore a consistent 
discount rate series for the whole period does not exist. For the federal funds rate in 2009, I plot the 
upper end of the range targeted by the Federal Reserve. The figure also shows the interest rate on 
reserves that was introduced in October 2008, discussed further below. 
2U.S. Treasury bills are three-month securities; total Treasury securities include bonds and notes, 
which have longer maturities. The figure includes only securities held outright, not those held as part 
of repurchase agreements. 
3The model is a simple version of the more complete analysis in Reis (2009). 
4See Brunnermeier (2009), Gorton (2009), and Greenlaw and others (2008). 
5The situation at the time looked so dire that the head of the International Monetary Fund, Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn, stated apocalyptically on October 11 that, “Intensifying solvency concerns about a 
number of the largest U.S.-based and European financial institutions have pushed the global financial 
system to the brink of systemic meltdown” (“Statement by the IMF Managing Director, Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn, to the International Monetary and Financial Committee on the Global Economy and 
Financial Markets, Washington, October 11”). 
6For alternative descriptions of the policy responses to the crisis, see Cecchetti (2009) for the United 
States and Blanchard (2009) for an international perspective, as well as the many speeches by 
governors of the Federal Reserve available on its “News & Events” page 
(www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/default.htm). An up-to-date exposition is the Federal Reserve’s 
statement of its “Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet” 
 (www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst.htm). 
7More precisely, in December 2008 the Federal Reserve started announcing upper and lower limits for 
this rate, which at that time were 0.25 percent and zero. 
8The December 2008 press release of the Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC) stated that, 
“...the Committee anticipates that weak economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low 
levels of the federal funds rate for some time.” The commitment to low interest rates has been 
reaffirmed at every meeting since then, with slightly different wording since March 2009. 
9The Federal Reserve also controls the interest rate that it charges banks that borrow from it directly at 
the discount window. Although banks rarely use the discount window during normal times, this 
facility can be important during crises. 
 
 
10For instance, in April 2009 Vice Chairman Donald Kohn stated, “...the Federal Reserve has begun 
making substantial purchases of longer-term securities in order to support market functioning and 
reduce interest rates in the mortgage and private credit markets” (“Policies to Bring Us Out of the 
Financial Crisis and Recession,” speech delivered at the College of Wooster, Wooster, Ohio, April 3, 
2009). Chairman Ben Bernanke stated that, “The principal goal of these programs is to lower the cost 
and improve the availability of credit for households and businesses” (“The Federal Reserve's Balance 
Sheet,” speech delivered at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond 2009 Credit Markets Symposium, 
Charlotte, N.C., April 3, 2009). 
11These included the Term Auction Facility (TAF), the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), the 
Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), the Term 
Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market 
Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF), and the Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF). 
12The Federal Reserve also made funds available to lend to the money market, through the MMIFF 
for money market funds, and through the AMLF programs for banks to finance purchases from 
money market funds. The first program was never used; the funds under the AMLF are included in 
the “direct loans” item on the balance sheet, but the balance is currently zero. 
13A few notes are in order regarding this capital. First, it is a very crude way to introduce an asset in 
this economy that is used as a means of payment. However, it allows me to keep the focus on the 
credit frictions and to avoid having to describe in detail the underlying theory of money or assets. 
Second, although I assume that, like money, capital pays a zero net return, generalizing the model to 
include a positive return does not change the results qualitatively. Third, I use the term “capital” and 40 
                                                                                                                                                        
not “money” because these assets can be thought of as broader than just high-powered money. They 
represent any claims that can be exchanged for consumption goods in the last period, and so they refer 
to all assets in this economy. Fourth, these assets could be private claims issued by the representative 
consumer, if the consumer could commit to their repayment, thus dispensing with the need for a 
government or taxes. However, decentralizing this economy to justify the existence of the 
representative consumer is a difficult task. Fifth, an alternative would be to assume that H is a 
physical good that can be stored without depreciating and can be transformed into the final 
consumption good in the final period. This leads to predictions similar to those in this paper, but 
messier algebra. 
14This limited pledgeability constraint has a long tradition in the modeling of capital market 
imperfections: see Matsuyama (2007) and Holmstrom and Tirole (2009) for recent reviews. Note that 
one can reinterpret the F setup costs as the cost to lenders to set up the monitoring technology to 
which only they have access, allowing them to capture 1-δ of the revenue. 
15Note that S is the total revenue from selling the security in the first period, so that S/Q is the number 
of securities sold paying this amount of capital in the third period. The same applies to S
′. 
16 I assume that even if traders abscond with the securities, they can show up to redeem them in the 
last period. 
17Lenders cannot obtain direct financing from investors, since in equilibrium their assets will consist 
solely of the outstanding loans. Only lenders can monitor these loans, so seizing the lenders’ assets 
would produce zero revenue.  
18The fact that capital gains on a portfolio of securities are always nonnegative is a consequence of the 
lack of aggregate uncertainty. It is straightforward to extend the model to include uncertainty; since 
all agents are risk-neutral, this would change little in the analysis after replacing expected for actual 
values. 
19Q
* is defined as 










20With these four variables determined, equilibrium wages and hours worked are determined by 
equations 4 and 5. Equilibrium output and consumption follow from using the production function 
and the market clearing condition in the goods market. 
21One can see that the efficient equilibrium in this graph would require that the SM line lie to the right 
of I = 1 so that, in the second period, demand and supply would coincide over a line segment in the 
region at the top where they are horizontal. The catastrophic equilibrium occurs when the supply 
curve intersects the demand curve in its lower horizontal segment. 
22One feature of this model, as well as of most models of credit frictions, is that there is too little 
borrowing. Some have argued that the current crisis is due rather to too much borrowing, but to my 
knowledge this has not yet been formalized. 
23This assumes that the central bank is not trying to profit from the loan, so that the net interest rate it 
charges is zero. 
24Leaving the constrained equilibrium and reaching the efficient one would require large loans in 
either or both periods. If that is not possible, then a well-calibrated increase in the funds available to 
traders in both periods could simultaneously improve both extensive- and intensive-margin efficiency. 
25The Federal Reserve’s discomfort with these actions is clear in Chairman Bernanke’s speech of 
April 3, 2009, cited above: “[The purchases covered by Maiden LLC] are very different than the other 
liquidity programs discussed previously and were put in place to avoid major disruptions in financial 
markets. From a credit perspective, these support facilities carry more risk than traditional central 
bank liquidity support, but we nevertheless expect to be fully repaid .… These operations have been 
extremely uncomfortable for the Federal Reserve to undertake and were carried out only because no 
reasonable alternative was available.” 
26In reality, agents receiving the funds need not literally abscond with them. They may instead pick 
dishonest partners, exert too little effort, or divert company investments toward private gains. 
27See Woodford (2008), among many others. 
28One assumption implicit in these two equations is that real money balances do not affect the 41 
                                                                                                                                                        
marginal utility of consumption. Although deviations from this strict separability assumption can have 
strong theoretical implications for monetary policy (Reis 2007), empirically the deviations seem small 
(see section 3.4 in Woodford 2003). 
29Adding a real activity variable to bring this rule close to a Taylor rule would change nothing in the 
analysis. 
30In the world outside the model, this sharp distinction between fiscal and monetary policy has 
become blurred by the recent cooperation between the Federal Reserve and the Treausry in addressing 
the crisis.  
31The initial conditions are Mt-1, Bt-1
F, Bt-1, Kt-1, and the terminal conditions come from consumer 




P/Pt+j = 0 and limj→∞β
ju
′(Ct+j)Mt+j/Pt+j = 0. 
32See Woodford (2003) and Mishkin (2009). 
33See, for instance, Chairman Bernanke’s speech on “The Great Moderation,” delivered at the Eastern 
Economic Association, Washington, February 20, 2004. 
34From the joint statement of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury on March 23, 2009: “The Federal 
Open Market Committee (FOMC) determines monetary conditions in the United States, subject to its 
congressional mandate to foster maximum sustainable employment and stable prices. The Federal 
Reserve’s independence with regard to monetary policy is critical for ensuring that monetary policy 
decisions are made with regard only to the long-term economic welfare of the nation.” From the same 
statement: “Actions that the Federal Reserve takes, during this period of unusual and exigent 
circumstances, in the pursuit of financial stability, such as loans or securities purchases that influence 
the size of its balance sheet, must not constrain the exercise of monetary policy as needed to foster 
maximum sustainable employment and price stability.” 
35As Vice Chairman Kohn put it in a speech in May 2009, “An important issue with our 
nontraditional policies is the transition back to a more normal stance and operations of monetary 
policy as financial conditions improve and economic activity picks up enough to increase resource 
utilization. These actions will be critical to ensuring price stability as the real economy returns to 
normal” (“Interactions between Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the Current Situation,” speech 
delivered at Princeton University, May 23, 2009).  
36As Chairman Bernanke stated in his April 3 speech, cited above, “We have a number of tools we 
can use to reduce bank reserves or increase short-term interest rates when that becomes necessary.… 
Many of our lending programs extend credit primarily on a short-term basis and thus could be wound 
down relatively quickly.… The Federal Reserve can conduct reverse repurchase agreements against 
its long-term securities holdings to drain bank reserves or, if necessary, it could choose to sell some of 
its securities.”  
37The Federal Reserve has repeatedly stated that it believes the risk of losses is minimal (see, for 
example, Chairman Bernanke’s Stamp Lecture at the London School of Economics, “The Crisis and 
the Policy Response,” January 13, 2009), because in most of its programs it is taking triple-A-rated 
securities as collateral and imposing significant haircuts. There is reason to be a little skeptical, 
however. First, if the investments were riskless, one would expect that private investors would not be 
so reluctant to make them. Second, there is a certain irony in appealing to the high ratings of the 
collateral when the financial crisis has been marked by suspicions about the value of collateral and the 
reliability of ratings agencies. 
38This is calculated by multiplying 0.05 by the sum of bank reserves plus Treasury deposits minus 
securities held outright. This maps onto the worst-case scenario, where the Treasury closes its deposit 
account with the Federal Reserve, demanding that its $240.2 billion in bonds be given back. 
Excluding this possibility, then already Bt
F > Mt. 
39Stella (2009) tries to quantify this risk and arrives at a worst-case scenario of losses of $78 billion 
on the existing assets (the sum of losses in Table 8 in his paper). 
40Note that this option relies on the existence of a finite satiation level in the demand for reserves, 
beyond which people are indifferent about the real money balances they hold. Otherwise, printing 
money would compromise the Federal Reserve’s target for inflation. 42 
                                                                                                                                                        
41Indeed, conventional measures of central bank independence typically consider budgetary 
independence from the legislative bodies a prerequisite (see the recent survey in Cukierman 2008). 
42This mechanism is described in Sims (1994) and Woodford (1995) and is discussed and criticized in 
Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001) and Bassetto (2008). 
43For further exploration of the implications of this fiscal theory of the price level within the context 
of the current crisis, see Sims (2009) and Cochrane (2009). 
44This work in turn builds on earlier analyses of monetary policy during the Great Depression. Romer 
(1992), in particular, makes a compelling case for the powerful role of monetary policy in ending the 
Depression. 
45The nominal interest rate on any safe security cannot be negative, because selling this security short 
and keeping the proceeds as cash until the security matures would result in positive profits and create 
an arbitrage opportunity. This is only approximately correct since the expected return on money is not 
exactly zero but slightly negative, as deposit accounts pay fees, and cash held in one’s pocket may be 
stolen. Nevertheless, it is likely very close to zero. Goodfriend (2000) and Buiter and Panigirtzoglou 
(2003) have revived an old proposal by Silvio Gesell for the government to tax money, effectively 
removing the lower bound on interest rates and therefore eliminating the possibility of liquidity traps. 
46On exchange rate policy see Svensson (2003), on debt purchases see Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005), 
on price-level targeting see Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), and on lowering long-term interest 
rates see Bernanke (2002). 
47This was clearly stated by Vice Chairman Kohn on October 9, 2009. 









  U.S. Treasury bills  277.0 Commercial bank reserves   20.0
  U.S. Treasury notes and bonds  501.9 U.S. Treasury deposits  6.2
   Agency debt  0 Reverse repurchase agreements  29.7
Repurchase agreements  39.8 Other liabilities  10.6
Direct loans  1.3  
Gold  11.0 Total liabilities  847.9
Foreign reserves  20.5   
Other assets  16.7 Capital  30.6
    









    U.S. Treasury bills  18.4 Commercial bank reserves  860.0
    U.S. Treasury notes and bonds  457.5 U.S. Treasury deposits  365.4
    Agency debt  19.7 Reverse repurchase agreements   88.4
Repurchase agreements  80.0 Others  56.8
Direct loans  193.9  
Gold  11.0 Total liabilities  2,223.8
Foreign reserves  579.8  















    U.S. Treasury bills  18.4 Commercial bank reserves  818.8
    U.S. Treasury notes and bonds  717.7 U.S. Treasury deposits  240.2
    Agency debt  111.8 Reverse repurchase agreements  68.4
Repurchase agreements  0 Others  14.4
Direct loans  106.3  









































First period flow of funds:
Lenders -> Entrepreneurs (loan for set-up costs)
Traders -> Lenders (securities market)
Investors -> Traders (leverage)
Second period flow of funds:
Lenders -> Entrepreneurs (credit lines)
Traders -> Lenders (securities market)
Investors -> Traders (leverage over capital gains)
Investors -> Lenders (if Q’ =1 - Ԅሻ
Third period flow of funds:
Entrepreneurs -> Lenders (loans repaid)
Lenders -> Traders (securities mature)
Lenders -> Investors (securities mature)
Traders -> Investors (leverage repaid)
All agents  -> representative household
(initial capital and profits)
 
 
 
Panel B. Markets 
 
 Figure 5. Equilibrium in a Constrained Economy 
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Figure 6. Effect of Injecting Credit through Loans to Lenders and Traders  
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